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"I have come to the conclusion that politics are a too serious matter to be left to the politicians."
By Charles de Gaulle
The agenda of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev for August 26 was pretty busy. On that day, the Russian 
chief of state informed the world community that it has signed the decree recognising the Republic of South 
Ossetia (RSO) and the Republic of Abkhazia. Of course, that day was a new reference point of relations around 
the world. The western community has started looking for levers of influence on Russia, but it ascertained that 
a monopole organisation of the world is absent indeed.
By coincidence, Mr. Medvedev met Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin on August 25. After the meeting, the 
latter "was content with the result of talks with Dmitri Medvedev, assuring that the Transnistrian problem was 
the focus of the meeting with the Russian president."
According to the official press release, "the chief of state has noticed a special interest of Dmitri Medvedev 
towards the draft law on status of the Transnistrian autonomy worked out on the basis of the law on key 
principles of the special legal status of localities from the left bank of the Dniester, which was voted through a 
political consensus on July 22, 2005.
The resolution of the Transnistrian conflict shall be based on the unanimous decision of the Moldovan political 
class – the Parliament of the country, the president stated. He noted that "the Russian Federation does not 
raise important objections against the draft law concerned."
At the same time, Russia’s position was clearly presented in the media, which published statements by Foreign 
Minister Serghei Lavrov. It published diametrically opposite statements! According to Lavrov, the parties in the 
Transnistrian settlement are ready to reconsider the Kozak Plan released in 2003 and resolve the remaining 
problems. "Now almost all parties in the conflict are persuaded of the necessity to reconsider the same princi-
ples which were so close to become agreements in 2003" (Sergei Lavrov was quoted as saying). It means that 
Moscow will not consider possibilities which unfit the Kozak Plan.
Otherwise, such different interpretations have become common and predictable. In Moscow or other Russian 
localities the Moldovan side demonstrates pro-Russia visions while meeting representatives of the Russian 
elite. On the other hand, Moldovan personalities become pro-European while visiting European countries. Un-
fortunately this is the reality, and the Moldovan establishment has never been outstanding as a leader in the 
negotiation process, it has never looked for real solutions, demonstrating some manoeuvres but being actually 
nobody among the strong, changing positions or having several viewpoints at the same time. The Moldovan 
establishment, which is expecting "happiness from the West" in this century, has done a little to approach the 
West. Given all these facts, the Moldovan expert community, which is in touch with the governance one or 
another way, is involuntarily and often reproducing the certitude and certainty of the latter, but regretfully this 
certainty is not based on facts but rather on gossip from "the top". There is an impression that the absolute 
majority of Moldovan expert community usually reacts accordingly to the rule: "it is better to give a comfort-
able interpretation to developments and come closer to their just interpretation than to appreciate them objec-
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tively." Majority of experts assured that Russia will never recognise Ossetia and Abkhazia and gave wonderful 
arguments, reducing them indeed to international legal norms, which important international players gave up 
long ago and irreversibly. By the way, what international legal norms are for? The norm is an issue relating to 
an agreement only. That means that when one agrees in a big or small measure, it will consider something 
effective and this will really become effective (the least for those reaching the agreement concerned). Indeed, 
the Russian leadership has demonstrated this fact.
Talks about the fact that great powers are acting like gangsters, Russia has acted by following the dictum "pun-
ish one to square many" are ceaseless. But why not to admit that the U.S., NATO actions target at a precise 
algorithm and they are extremely predictable (but neither the E.U., nor the NATO think that this predictability 
is something negative)? The perseverant is the winner. Thus, by taking such actions, the Russian diplomacy 
followed and will follow eventual predictability of steps.
Little will experience any emotions and will enjoy the diplomatic actions by the Russian Federation. But in such 
a situation, Russia does not need any longer like in the 1990s to take the U.S. advice into consideration. Politi-
cal alliances are consolidated the most by noise of military shoes. The alliance of the Russian Federation with 
the new "friends from Caucasus" will be lasting. Now, let’s speak about "friends from Caucasus". Let’s recall 
that Transnistria, RSO and Abkhazia have built the "Commonwealth for the Rights of Nations" and the Interper-
liamentary Assembly on parliamentary dimension. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have opened representations 
in Tiraspol and Transnistria has representations in Sukhumi and Tzhinval.
Transnistria has activated its contacts with the "friends from Caucasus" after the recognition of RSO and Ab-
khazia, saying that they have the same rights. Both Ossetia and Abkhazia agree, but they would not dare to 
establish diplomatic relations with Transnistria without the consent of the "elder friend", that means Moscow. 
Thus, Moscow has got one more lever to press Chisinau. In other terms, Russia could not recognise the Tran-
snistrian region, but "new independent states where the majority of population is Russian would do it, why 
not? Of course, if the Russian president would give green light…
Here one more interesting moment. On August 26, on the day when the independence was recognised, Igor 
Smirnov met Dmitri Medvedev. The meeting took place right after talks with Voronin, immediately after the 
Moldovan president has reported his meeting with his Russian counterpart.
One more fact is worth to be mentioned. On August 21, during the meeting with Traian Basescu, Vladimir Vo-
ronin said that the military denouement of the conflict in South Ossetia was suggestive for Moldova, or there 
is a frozen conflict in its territory, too. Also, he called for a "restructuring of peacekeeping forces in countries 
facing frozen conflicts." That means in democratic terms that international forces shall replace the Russian 
peacekeepers.
What international forces were envisaged? Is this NATO, OSCE, EU or the U.N? But it is well-known that none 
of these organisations has real premises and takes any actions to set up a peacekeeping contingent.
Developments in the Russian Federation have halted the plans of the United States, which tended to promote 
slowly but cogently its role in the negotiation process and its participation in the life of the Transnistrian region 
via projects, programmes, contacts, etc.
There is one more important thing. If Chisinau did not experience this "hot August", nobody would have had 
reminded Transnistria as a serious issue and all would have been limited to routine reactions or there are more 
important problems in the virtue of the forthcoming electoral race. Majority of members of the Chisinau Gov-
ernment did not visit Transnistria, which is part of the Republic of Moldova, according to international treaties 
and agreements. I think that this majority will not want to visit this region in the near future. But the August 
developments have overthrown everything and negotiations with Moscow will be necessary, and some deci-
sions will be required, that means some things shall be accepted. But why Moscow? What about other players? 
They have their worries. Ukraine faces a permanent war against those from the political Olympus. What about 
new players? What about the EU, for example? But what did the EU propose in essence? What anything else 
beyond the immutability of the "5+2" negotiation format repeated every year? Did anybody support the least 
some ephemeral allusions about alleged European aspirations of Transnistria? No. What for? It seems that the 
EU did not decide yet how to get involved in the settlement process.
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Indeed, do the new players know well what they really want in this conflict?
An answer to the question how the Transnistrian issue will develop and how this problem will be settled will 
not be long-awaited. Or, developments are too fast.
But what to do, there are new times and a new world.
